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Acquisitions, Dispositions &
Structuring Techniques Corner
By Richard M. Lipton
Did IRS Err in New TAM on Allocation of Excess
Nonrecourse Liabilities?
In September 2004, the IRS released TAM 200436011,1
which addresses the allocation of excess nonrecourse
liabilities under Reg. §1.752-3(a)(3). The TAM will
likely be quite controversial because it reaches a
conclusion that is contrary to the plain language of
the applicable regulation.
The issue in TAM 200436011 is whether a gross
income allocation to a partner (X) is an allocation
of a significant item of partnership income or gain
which has substantial economic effect for purposes of
Reg. §1.752-3(a)(3). If it is, then the allocation could
be used to allocate 100 percent of the excess nonre-
course liabilities to X. The allocation of liabilities to
X could then be used to avoid gain recognition as a
result of a distribution to X.
Notwithstanding the plain language of the applica-
ble regulation, the IRS concluded that the allocation
to X of 100 percent of the third-tier allocations of
excess nonrecourse liabilities is inappropriate. Reg.
§1.752-3(a)(3) contemplates that partners will allocate
the excess nonrecourse liabilities in a manner that is
consistent with the way they share a significant item
of partnership income or gain that has substantial
economic effect. According to the IRS, the regulation
looks to how the partners share a class of partnership
income or gain rather than a gross income allocation
within a class of income. There does not appear to
be any basis for the IRS's conclusion.
Facts
In TAM 200436011, X was in the process of acquiring
another company. In order to obtain cash for the ac-
quisition, X decided to restructure and leverage its Z
assets. To accomplish the desired result, X organized
Y, a limited liability company classified as a partner-
ship for federal tax purposes, with third parties and
conveyed toY its Z assets with a fair market value of
$A. Y subsequently borrowed $D against the assets
that were contributed by X and against the assets
contributed by the other members of Y. Simultane-
ously, Y made a distribution to X of $B in cash and
issued to X senior preferred, junior preferred and
junior common interests.
In particular, X was issued 100 percent of the senior
preferred issues inY which is entitled to an F-percent
preferred return payable from gross income. Pursuant
to the operating agreement forY, X was allocated 100
percent of the gross income of Y every quarter up to
the amount of the preference on the senior preferred
interest. The operating agreement for Y specifically
allocated $B of the excess nonrecourse liabilities to X
(with the balance being allocated to another member
of Y) and provided that, for purposes of determining
X's share of nonrecourse liabilities, reference should
be made to the allocation of gross income with re-
spect to the senior preferred interest
Applicable Law
The central provision in thisTAM is Reg. §1.752-3(a)(3),
which addresses the allocation of excess nonrecourse
liabilities. Excess nonrecourse liabilities are the amount
by which nonrecourse liabilities exceed the nonre-
course liabilities that must be allocated to partners
with respect to partnership minimum gain and the
built-in minimum gain under Reg. §1.752-3(a)(1) and
(2), respectively. As a practical matter, in most cases
the excess nonrecourse liabilities of a partnership are
equal to the partnership's basis in its assets, because
any liabilities in excess of this amount will usually be
allocated under the first two tiers of allocations.
The regulation sanctions four methods for the allo-
cation of excess nonrecourse liabilities, of which two
are generally the most important. First, the regulation
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provides that a partner's share of the excess nonrecourse
liabilities is determined in accordance with the partner's
share of partnership profits. In order to determine the
partner's share of partnership profits, all facts and cir-
cumstances relating to the economic arrangement of
the partners are taken into account. Alternatively, the
partnership agreement may specify the partner's interest
in the partnership profits for purposes of allocating the
excess non recourse liabilities, provided that the interests
so specified are reasonably consistent with allocations
of some other significant item of partnership income or
gain that has substantial economic effect under Code
Sec. 704(b). In addition, excess nonrecourse liabilities
may be allocated among the partners in accordance with
the manner in which it is reasonably expected that the
deductions attributable to those nonrecourse liabilities
will be allocated. Additionally, the partnership may first
allocate an excess nonrecourse liability to a partner up to
the amount of built-in gain that is allocable to the part-
ner on Code Sec. 704(c) property or property for which
reverse Code Sec. 704(c) allocations are applicable.
The regulations contain an example concerning
the allocation of excess nonrecourse liabilities. In
Reg. §1.752-3(c), Example 2, it is assumed that A
and B are equal partners. However, the partnership
agreement provides that all depreciation deductions
will be allocated to partner A. The partners agree to
allocate excess nonrecourse liabilities in accordance
with the manner in which it is reasonably expected
that the deductions attributable to those nonrecourse
liabilities will be allocated. Assuming that the allo-
cation of depreciation to A is valid, all of the excess
nonrecourse liabilities would be allocated to A.
These regulations concerning the allocation of
excess nonrecourse liabilities are applicable for pur-
poses of determining whether a distribution made to a
partner in connection with a transfer of money to the
contributing partner gives rise to a disguised sale un-
der Code Sec. 707(a)(2)(B). Under Reg. §1.707-5(b)(1),
if a partner transfers property to a partnership, and
the partnership incurs a liability and all or a portion
of the proceeds of that liability are allocable under
Temporary Reg. §11.1 63-8T to a transfer of money or
other consideration with 90 days of incurring the li-
ability, the transfer of money or other consideration
to the partner is taken into account only to the extent
that the amount of money or the fair market value
of the other consideration transferred exceeds that
partner's allocable share of the partnership liability.
To determine the partner's share of liability, reference
is made to the partner's share of excess nonrecourse
liabilities under Reg. §1.752-3(a)(3).
The Ruling
In TAM 200436011, the taxpayer argued that liabili-
ties incurred by the partnership in the amount of $B
could be allocated to X because that allocation was
consistent with the allocation to X of 100 percent of
the gross income of the partnership with respect to
the senior preferred interest. According to the tax-
payer, this allocation of gross income is an allocation
of a significant item of partnership income that has
substantial economic effect, so that the allocation
effectively can be used to "drag" an allocation of
debt under Reg. §1.752-3(a)(3).
The IRS never responded directly to this argument.
Instead, the IRS contended that the phrase "a sig-
nificant item of partnership income or gain" in the
regulation refers to a significant class of partnership
income or gain (even though the word class is not
in the regulation). According to the IRS, the point of
the third-tier allocation in Reg. §1 .752-3(a)(3) is to
match the excess nonrecourse deductions up with
the manner in which the partners share a significant
economic item of partnership income or gain. To
simply consider a single gross income allocation in
isolation does not encompass this sharing concept.
While acknowledging that X was getting 100 per-
cent of a specific gross income allocation, the IRS
contended that the allocation does not truly reflect
overall the economic relationship between the par-
ties with respect to that item of partnership income.
Thus, it cannot be what was intended by the third-tier
allocation permitted in the regulation.
The IRS stated its belief that the regulation's refer-
ence to a "significant item of partnership income
or gain" does not refer to a traunch of bottom-line
gross or net income; rather, according to the IRS, it
refers to partnership income of a certain character
or type, such as gain from the sale of property or
tax-exempt income.
The IRS justified this conclusion by referring to the
phrase "items of income" as used in the Code Sec.
704(b) regulations. The IRS noted that Reg. §1.704-
1 (b)(1)(vii) provides that Code Sec. 704(b) and Reg.
§1.704-1(b) apply to "allocations of income, gain,
loss, deduction and credit, allocations of specific
items of income, gain, loss, deduction and credit, and
allocations of partnership net or 'bottom line' taxable
income and loss. An allocation to a partner of a share
of partnership net or 'bottom line' taxable income or
loss shall be treated as an allocation to such partner of
the same share of each item of income, gain, loss and
deduction that is taken into account in computing
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such net or 'bottom line' taxable income or loss."
The IRS stated that the Code Sec. 704(b) regula-
tion distinguishes between allocations of "items
of income" and allocations of partnership net or
"bottom line" income, and that an allocation of a
share of partnership net income is treated as an al-
location of the same share of each item of income.
Under this regulation, an allocation of a 50-percent
share or traunch of partnership gross or net income
is not treated as the allocation of 100 percent of a
single item of income; it is treated as an allocation
of a 50-percent share of each item of income. Given
the interdependence between the regulations under
Code Secs. 752 and 704(b), the IRS contended that it
is appropriate to interpret "items of income" for pur-
poses of the Code Sec. 752 regulations consistently
with its interpretation for purposes of the Code Sec.
704(b) regulations.
Thus, the IRS con- The regulations reql
tended that the "more
appropriate" view of what the allocation
constitutes a "significant the taxpayer if
item of partnership in- reasonably coi
come or gain that has allocations of sor
substantial economic
effect," as that phrase item of partn
is used in Reg. §1.752-
3(a)(3), is to examine the
manner in which the partners share items of eco-
nomic significance and determine if the allocation
is consistent with the manner in which the partners
share the items. For example, suppose a 50/50
partnership agrees to allocate the first $100 of gross
income, an item or income or gain, to Partner 1 and
the remaining gross income to Partner 2. Assume
further that the partnership agreement provides that
for purposes of Reg. §1.752-3(a)(3), the allocations
of excess nonrecourse liabilities will be made in
accordance with the manner in which the partners
share the first $100 of gross income. Under the
taxpayer's theory, Partner 1 would be entitled to
100 percent of the third-tier allocation. However,
assuming that the total amount of gross income of
the partnership is $500, Partner 1 is being allocated
only 20 percent of the total gross income of the part-
nership. Given this, the IRS contended that it was
not "appropriate" for Partner 1 to be allocated 100
percent of the third-tier allocations because it does
not truly reflect the underlying economic relations
of the partners. Therefore, it is consistent with the
"purpose" of the third-tier allocation regulations for
Partner 1 to be allocated 20 percent of the excess
U
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nonrecourse liabilities, if gross income is the item
the taxpayer chooses to follow.
Analysis
The IRS's conclusion in TAM 200436001 is very trou-
bling. It appears that the IRS decided to ignore the
plain language of the regulations under Code Sec. 752
because the IRS did not believe that the result claimed
by the taxpayer was "contemplated" or "intended" by
those regulations. However, the regulations are abso-
lutely clear, and the only abuse in this situation is the
strained interpretation proffered by the IRS. The IRS
also ignored language in the regulations under Code
Sec. 704(b) that were consistent with the Code Sec.
752 regulations. See Reg. §1.704-2(e)(2).
The taxpayer in TAM 20043 6001 took advantage of
the provision in the regulations that allows a partner-
ship agreementto allocate
ire the IRS to respect excess nonrecourse li-
hat is made by abilities. The regulationsrequire the IRS to respect
uch allocation is the allocation that is made
sistent with the by the taxpayer if such
e other significant allocation is reasonablyconsistent with the al-
'rship income, locations of some other
significant item of partner-
ship income. The taxpayer
used the allocation of the first layer of gross income
to partner X to support the allocation of excess non-
recourse liabilities.
The IRS could counter the taxpayer only by stating
that it was not "contemplated" that an allocation of a
layer of gross income would support an allocation of
excess nonrecourse liabilities. But it does not matter
what was "contemplated" by the drafters of the regu-
lations-what matters is what the regulations say. And
in this case, the regulations expressly require only
that the debt allocation be "reasonably consistent"
with an allocation of some other significant item of
partnership income, which in this case was the first
layer of gross income.The language of the regulations
directly refutes the IRS's position.
Moreover, the IRS's example in TAM 200436001
is self-defeating. In the example, Partner 1 was al-
located the first $100 of gross income but only 1/5
of the total gross income of the partnership; the IRS
contended that Partner 1 could be allocated only
20 percent of the excess nonrecourse liabilities
of the partnership. This argument effectively dis-
regards the alternative methods provided in Reg.
§1 .752-3(a)(3) and requires, instead, that excess
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nonrecourse liabilities be allocated on the basis
of a partner's share of partnership profits. But this
approach is expressly provided in the regulations
as the first-but not the exclusive-means to al-
locate excess nonrecourse liabilities.
Put simply, it appears in TAM 200436011 that
the IRS did not like the result reached under the
regulations. So the IRS ignored the plain language
of the regulations under Code Sec. 752-and
relied upon other regulations that were not appli-
cable-to reach a contrary conclusion. This is the
type of analysis which, if it were engaged in by a
taxpayer, could result in penalties for intentional
disregard of rules and regulations. Hopefully, the
IRS will realize that it undermines the credibility of
the tax system if the administrator ignores the rules
in order to reach a more favorable result for the
FISC. If the IRS does not like the way that taxpayers
can allocate excess nonrecourse liabilities under
Reg. §1 .752-3(a)(3), the IRS could amend the regu-
lations. But the IRS cannot simply ignore them, as
it appears to be doing in TAM 200436011.
ENDNOTES
1 TAM 200436011 (Apr. 30, 2004).
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